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http://cimat.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/handle/1008/943| Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games | |
| LUIS HERNANDEZ LAMONEDA | |
| Acceso Abierto | |
| Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual | |
| Teoría de Juegos | |
| In this paper we study an expression for all additive, symmetric and efficient solutions, i.e., the set of axioms that traditionally are used to characterize the Shapley value except for the dummy axiom. Also, we obtain an expression for this kind of solutions by including the self duality axiom. These expressions allow us to give an alternative formula for the consensus value, the generalized consensus value and the solidarity solution. Furthermore, we introduce a new axiom called coalitional independence which replaces the symmetry axiom and use it to get similar results. | |
| Vanderbilt University | |
| 2008 | |
| Artículo | |
| Inglés | |
| Investigadores | |
| OTRAS | |
| Versión publicada | |
| publishedVersion - Versión publicada | |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Matemáticas |
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| Fichero | Tamaño | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
| LHLamoneda.pdf | 119.57 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |